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THE ZONING VARIANCE POWER CONSTRUCTIVE
IN THEORY, DESTRUCTIVE IN PRACTICE
By

RONALD M.

SHAPIRO*

The variance power, to be consistent with its theoretical objectives and legal limitations, should be exercised sparingly, with particular
care to avoid harmful side effects. However, the local boards of appeal,
the possessors of the variance power, have apparently given little effect
to these legal and theoretical restraints. Board decisions are frequently
the product of improper considerations, ranging beyond the scope of
legal limitations and legitimate land use policies. This course of conduct
has led and will increasingly lead to a flood of illegal variations which
challenge the protective aims of zoning and, consequently, endanger
the integrity and desirability of urban neighborhoods.
The striking disparity between the theory of the variance power
and its practical application is the theme of this article. The article
will examine in detail the nature of this disparity, its consequences with
respect to the specific problems of urban areas, and the possible directions which a reform of the variance procedure could take. While the
discussion will cover variance problems in several cities, its dominant
foci will be Boston and Baltimore, cities in which sparse research has
been done on this topic. Boston offers two particularly compelling inducements for study. First, it presents a variance situation which is
analogous to urban land use situations in other areas. Second, Boston
recently enacted a zoning code aimed at, among other things, a reform
of the Boston variance machinery. The experience in Boston under
the new code may provide valuable insight for cities, like Baltimore,
which are contemplating the passage of new zoning ordinances.
I.

THE

VARIANCE

IN

THEORY -

ZONING'S

SAFETY VALVE

Theoretically, at least, the board of appeals variance procedure is
not the proper method for correcting imperfect zoning. The appropriate remedy is legislative amendment of the zoning ordinance' by the
* Associate, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland;
Lecturer, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1964, Haverford College;
LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School.
1. F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY, THS TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE WITH
COMMENTARY 57 (3d ed. 1966).
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City Council, as in Baltimore,2 or by a zoning commission, as in
Boston.3 Conceptually, the variance is a "permitted violation" of the
zoning regulations; it does not involve a change in the ordinance or in
the zoning map. Historically, variances were designed to serve as
administrative "safety valves" which would save zoning schemes
from the threat of endless litigation. It was feared that zoning ordinances might be challenged as illegal deprivations of property unless a
procedure existed to waive the restrictions where they appeared to
impose unconstitutional limitations on the use of property.4 The more
widely supported view today, however, considers the variance an
administrative remedy intended to alleviate situations where hardship
on a particular landowner outweighs the value that would be derived
by the community if strict adherence to the ordinance were maintained. 5
An accurate appraisal of variances necessitates an analysis of the
often substantial distinction between legal theory and enforcement practices.' The legal authority for the issuance of the variance lies in
municipal ordinances enacted under the authority of state enabling
acts. 7 Ordinarily the statutes empower local boards of appeal to vary
the application of zoning regulations in certain unusual cases.' Board
members, usually appointed by the local executive authority,9 are
selected typically on the basis of political considerations: "[T]hey
are not necessarily chosen either on the basis of expertise in land-use
planning or of any particular professional qualification to perform a
quasi-judicial function."'"
In most jurisdictions a board of appeals must make at least
two essential findings before authorizing a variance. First, the board
must ascertain whether enforcement of the ordinance against the applicant would, due to special conditions on his property, impose "unnecessary hardship" upon him. Second, the board must find that the proposed
variance will not alter the character of the neighborhood nor interfere
with the public purposes of the ordinance.'
These requirements are
usually stated in statutes which offer no definition of unnecessary
hardship. As a result, boards of appeal must often fend for themselves
in applying the standard, deriving as much knowledge as they can
from court decisions on the subject.
While there is some confusion in Baltimore between variances
and their zoning cousin, the special exception, 2 there are basically
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1 (1967).
3. Ch. 665, [1956] Mass. Acts 610.
4. Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103
U. PA. L. Rv.516 (1955).
5. Id. See also Sussna, Zoning Boards, 37 LAND ECONOMICS 82 (1961).
6. Compare parts I and II of this Article.
7. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66B (1967). See also note 11 infra.
8. See notes 11-16 infra and accompanying text.
9. In Boston the selection is made by the Mayor. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
40A, § 14 (1966). See also BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 30, § 39(a) (1966).
10. C. HAAR, LAW AND LAND 135 (1964).
11. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 15(3) (Ter. ed. 1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 45-24-13 (1956).
12. A special exception is a specific use permitted by the ordinance if the comprehensive zoning plan is generally conformed to and the neighborhood is not adversely
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three provisions of the Baltimore zoning ordinance which govern
the grant of what may generally be considered a zoning variance.
Pursuant to this ordinance, the Baltimore Board of Zoning Appeals
may allow a variation, or, in the language of the ordinance, "make
special exceptions," when "there are practical difficulties or unnecessary
hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of any of the provisions" of the ordinance,'5 or where "the use or change of use of
land, buildings or structures proposed to be used is limited as to its
location because of the size of buildings, size of yards, irregularity
of shape of land or buildings, topography, grade or accessibility," 14
and, where the proposed variation "shall not create hazards from fire
or disease or shall not menace the public health, security, or morals."' 5
In 1965, after almost forty years observance of a zoning law
which included the general variance standards described above, the
Boston Zoning Commission adopted a new zoning code. 6 The new
code attempts to focus more directly on the factors which the Boston
Board of Appeals should consider in determining whether or not a
variance would be proper. 7 The operative subsection appears to be
grounded on judicial decisions which have elaborated upon the meaning
and intent of the unnecessary hardship standard.' Although the code
describes the criteria in three parts, 9 a close reading reveals that five
conjunctive prerequisites must be met before a variance may be granted
by the Board of Appeals: (1) that "special circumstances or conditions" apply to the property for which the variance is sought; (2)
that such conditions are peculiar to that property and are not present
in the neighborhood in general; (3) that for reasons of "practical
difficulty and demonstrable substantial hardship" the variance is necessary for "reasonable use" of the property; (4) that the variance grant
will not derogate from the "general purpose" of the code and "will
not be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare"; and, (5) that the proposed variance would be the
"minimum variance that will accomplish this purpose."2 This statutory pattern follows the outline of the Model Zoning Ordinance in
attempting to give the Board of Appeals clearer guidelines for decision,
insofar as indefinite terms can be given precise meaning. 2' Because all
affected. A variance is a violation of the zoning plan which is permitted because of
a showing of hardship. See Carson, Reclassification, Variances, and Special Exceptions
in Maryland, 21 MD. L. Rxv. 306, 314-17 (1961). In Baltimore, however, this difference is not apparent, "since an exception, apparently, overlaps a variance inasmuch
as both may be granted where there are 'practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships.'" Marino v. Mayor and City Council, 215 Md. 206, 216, 137 A.2d 198, 201
(1957).
13. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 30, § 40(c) (1966).
14. Id. § 40(b).

15. Id.§ 39(j).
16. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE (1955). The code was enacted under the
authority of the 1956 enabling act, ch. 665, [19561 Mass. Acts 610.
17. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE § 7-3 (1955).
18. See cases discussed notes 23-43 infra.
19. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE § 7-3 (1955).
20. Id.
21. F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY, THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE WITH
COMMENTARY § 9-3, at 52 (3d ed. 1966).
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of the prerequisites have a basis in judicial decisions, they should be
sufficiently insulated from judicial attack.
Although ordinances such as the new Boston code, or to a more
limited extent the Baltimore zoning ordinance, provide standards for
variance applicants and for the boards of appeal, they do not comprise the total legal framework which attends the variance power.
Because legislative standards are necessarily vague, judicial elaboration
of these standards provides the precise theoretical limitations on board
of appeals variance activity. A survey of judicial authority in various
states reveals the rigid tests which variance grants must meet if they
are to be sustained on judicial review. 22 Setting the trend for other
jurisdictions, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disclosed its
antipathy toward indiscriminate allowance of variances at a very early
date. In 1926, just two years after the adoption of Boston's first zoning
code, the court declared:
It is manifest from the tenor of the zoning act as a whole . . .
that the power of authorizing variations from the general provisions of the statute is designed to be sparingly exercised. It is
only in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances that
the relaxation of the general restrictions established by the statute
ought to be permitted. 3
In the same vein, the Maryland Court of Appeals has stated: "[The
board of appeals is] not to authorize a granting for the mere convenience to the owner but to require a showing of urgent necessity,
hardship peculiar to the particular property, and a burden upon the
owner not justified by the public health, safety and welfare.''24
In addition, the courts have refined and particularized the elements
necessary to obtain a variance. "Unnecessary hardship" has traditionally been the prime requirement for the issuance of a variance. Because
variances were not devised as a remedy for difficulties arising out of
an individual's peculiar circumstances, the hardship must bear some relationship to the property itself2 5 and must not merely arise from the
personal situation of the owner-applicant.2" Regardless of the individual
situation of the owner, if some other person could use the property
for the purpose for which it is zoned there is no hardship.27 Unnecessary hardship exists where, in the absence of a variance, no feasible
use can be made of the land,28 that is, if the requirements of the zoning
ordinance would cause a "taking in the constitutional sense" of the
property.2 9 The hardship must pertain directly to property which
would receive the variation. The situation often arises where the
22. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20
280, 282-89 (1955).

LAW

&

CONT91MP. PROB.

23. Norcross v. Board of Appeal, 225 Mass. 177, 185, 150 N.E. 887, 890 (1926)
(dictum).

24. Mayor and City Council v. Polakoff, 233 Md. 1, 9, 194 A.2d 819, 824 (1963).
25. Id.
26. Planning Board v. Board of Appeals, 338 Mass. 160, 154 N.E.2d 349 (1958).
27. SHURTLEFF & CANTELMO, PLANNING LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN MASSA-

CHUSeTTS

57 (1964).

28. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1396 (1960).
29. Sapero v. Mayor and City Council, 235 Md. 1, 3, 200 A.2d 74, 75 (1964).
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owner of a business desires to utilize adjoining or nearby property,
located in a non-business district, for purposes of expansion. In such
cases the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has uniformly insisted that hardship related to the principal business property does
not attach to the property for which the variance is sought."°
Since a board of appeals is at least partially analogous to a court
of equity, the difficulties which a variance applicant is pleading must
not be the result of his own doing. For example: "Hardship cannot
be claimed by one who purchases with knowledge of restrictions."31
Moreover, if the adversity is not unique to the property in question
but affects generally the properties in the zoning district, the hardship
requirement is not satisfied.32 For example, an applicant may seek a
variation to build a two-story business building in a general residence
use district. He may urge as hardship that the nature of the soil
makes it impractical to construct apartments, a permitted use. The
board should disallow the variance if it appears that the soil condition3
extends generally throughout the particular use classification area.1
When there is a general hardship, this situation must be remedied by
revision of the general zoning regulations, a legislative act beyond the
scope of board of appeals power, not by granting special privileges
or variations to single owners. In effect, an applicant must show that
a variance will not give him an advantage over his neighbors - that
he will not gain any special privilege not enjoyed by the remaining
lands and buildings adhering to the zoning restrictions of the district.
Although economic considerations enter into most appeals, financial
hardship alone cannot be asserted as the basis for a variance. 4 The
fact that the applicant is unable to put the premises to a more profitable
use does not itself warrant relief.3 5 Only in cases of extreme pecuniary
hardship due to the peculiarities of the property, such as an applicant
who will be driven out of business in the absence of a remedy, will
monetary distress appeal to the courts.36
The courts have rejected arguments which emphasize the contiguity of the applicant's land to a zone where the use sought would
30. Hurley v. Kolligan, 333 Mass. 170, 129 N.E.2d 920 (1955) ; accord, Brackett
v. Board of Appeal, 311 Mass. 52, 39 N.E.2d 956 (1942).
31. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 285 (1955). See also Gleason v. Keswick Imp. Ass'n, 197 Md. 46,
50 (1951) ; Pem Construction Co. v. City of Baltimore, 233 Md. 372, 377, 196 A.2d
879, 881 (1964). But see Frankel v. Mayor and City Council, 223 Md. 97, 101, 162
A.2d 447, 449-50 (1959), in which the Court of Appeals has stated that this rule
does not apply where the applicant could make no reasonable use of the property
without the variance.
32. Kennerly v. Mayor and City Council, 247 Md. 601, 233 A.2d 800 (1967)
Vainas v. Board of Appeals, 337 Mass. 591, 150 N.E.2d 721 (1958) ; Easter v. Mayor
and City Council, 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492 (1950).
33. Bicknell Realty Co. v. Board of Appeal, 330 Mass. 676, 116 N.E.2d 570,
573 (1953).
34. Easter v. Mayor and City Council, 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492 (1950).
Cf. DiRico v. Board of Appeals, 341 Mass. 607, 171 N.E.2d 144 (1961). See also
SHURTLEFF & CANTELMO, PLANNING LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN

MASSACHUSTTS

57, 76 (1964).
35. Bicknell Realty Co. v. Board of Appeal, 330 Mass. 676, 116 N.E.2d 570
(1953) ; cf. Mayor and City Council v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965).
36. Note, Zoning in New England, 36 BosT. L. REv. 354, 438 (1956).

8
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be permissible, 7 even where it is shown that existing use restrictions
reduce sharply the value of a property in comparison to its worth if a
variation were granted.3" It is well established that hardship caused
by proximity to areas of commercial activity is not a sufficient basis
to justify the exercise of the narrowly confined power of granting a
variance. 9 While this rule appears harsh in its effect on the applicant,
the integrity of a comprehensive zoning plan, according to the courts,
requires its application. Reversing a board decision which permitted
the construction of stores in a residence district near a long-existing
business section, a Massachusetts court articulated the following rationale for disallowing variances based on contiguity to districts which
permit the desired use: "A district has to end somewhere. Care should
be taken lest the boundaries of a district be pared down in successive
proceedings granting variances to owners who from time to time
through such proceedings find their respective properties abutting upon
premises newly devoted to business purposes."4 A similar rationale
has been advanced by the Maryland Court of Appeals to support its
rejection of variations based on the existence of non-conforming uses
of the type sought by the applicant on other properties in the same
zoning district. 4'
Even when the applicant has satisfied all other requirements,
variances have been refused by the courts where they would effect a
substantial change in the zoning of a neighborhood.42 Such an effect
would be in derogation of the protective purposes of the zoning ordinance. A board considering a request for a commercial use in a residential district must weigh possible detrimental consequences to the
neighborhood; the possibility of increased fire hazards, enlarged traffic
problems or inordinately reduced property values should deter the board
from authorizing a variation.4" The Maryland Court of Appeals has
stated: "[T]he detriment to the applicant must be weighed against
the benefit to the community in maintaining the general plan."44 The
Massachusetts court revealed its policy for protecting neighborhood
integrity from harmful variations when it observed: "The dominant
design of any zoning act is to promote the general welfare . .

.

. The

stability of the neighborhood and the protection of property of others
37. Mayor and City Council v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965).
38. Sullivan v. Board of Appeals, 346 Mass. 81, 190 N.E.2d 83 (1963).
39. Id.
40. Real Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 319 Mass. 180, 184, 65 N.E.2d 199,
201 (1946). See also Coolidge v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 343 Mass. 742, 180 N.E.2d
670 (1962). But see Tanzilli v. Casassa, 324 Mass. 113, 85 N.E.2d 220 (1949).
41. The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated:
[It is not] material that three buildings, some distance to the north, extend to
the building line ...... Ill-advised or illegal variances do not furnish grounds
for a repetition of the wrong. If this were not so, one variation would sustain if
it did not compel others, and thus the general regulation eventually would be
nullified. The annulment of zoning is a legislative function that is beyond the
domain of the zoning board."
Easter v. Mayor and City Council, 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492 (1950).
42. Atherton v. Board of Appeals, 334 Mass. 451, 136 N.E.2d 201 (1960).
43. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. Rgv. 1396, 1405 (1960). E.g., Everpure
Ice Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 324 Mass. 433, 86 N.E.2d 906 (1949).
44. Easter v. Mayor and City Council, 195 Md. 395, 401, 73 A.2d 491, 493 (1950).
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in the vicinity are important considerations." 4 5 A landowner in a particular district has the right to expect that the zone will enjoy a "fair
degree of permanency." 4 If the relief applied for will harm the neighborhood, then the applicant must suffer to maintain the welfare of
the public.
Court decisions, such as those of the Maryland and Massachusetts
courts, and zoning ordinances like the new Boston code have clearly
circumscribed the power of boards of appeal to grant variances.
Theoretically, very specific standards relating to hardship, the nature
of the property and protection of the surrounding neighborhood must
be met before zoning's "safety valve" can open. The law clearly indicates that variations should not be granted indiscriminately. Nevertheless, it appears that boards of appeal have turned a blind eye
toward zoning regulations and a deaf ear to the rulings of the courts.

Because boards have performed dismally in adhering to proper standards, the variance procedure in practice is a far cry from the theoretical
and legal framework outlined in the statutes and refined by the courts.
II.

THE VARIANCE IN PRACTICE VALVE LEAKS

THE SAFETY

In spite of the courts' consistent attitude of disapproval, the integrity of zoning ordinances and the desirability of urban residential
areas have been constantly threatened by the possibility of improper
variances. By the mid-1930's critics already were charging that "easy
and erratic" variance practices "nibble away at existing zoning giving
special privileges to the chosen few."'4 7 More recently, one planning
expert estimated that fifty per cent of all board of appeals decisions,
the majority of them involving variances, were illegal usurpations
of power.4 s The board of appeals variance procedure, conceived as the
"safety valve" of the zoning ordinance, has ruptured into a steady
"leak" through which variations based on improper zoning objectives
increasingly escape. The integrity of the comprehensive zoning plan
may be seriously eroded by such indiscriminate variances.49 The incompatible land uses which result from this leak in the variance
machinery contribute to the spread of urban blight."0 For example,
in Boston, a city with a high rate of variance awards,51 the Redevelop45. Prusik v. Board of Appeal, 262 Mass. 451, 457, 160 N.E. 312, 314 (1928).
46. Everpure, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 324 Mass. 433, 86 N.E.2d 906 (1949).
47. WOODRuri, A ZONING PRIMER 66 (Proceedings of the Annual Planning
Conference 1935).
48. Blucher, Planning and Zoning Principles Violated, 13 ARK. L. REv. 1, 7 (1958).
49. Pomeroy, Losing the Effectiveness of Zoning Through Leakage, PLANNING
AND CIVIC COMMtN' 8-9 (Oct. 1941):
And it doesn't take very many such leaks to exhaust the strength of the zoning
plan. Even if excess densities, or the fudging of yard and area requirements, or
mayhap, the change in use, permitted by the Board of Appeals do not greatly
affect the broad land use and density pattern (if any) of the master plan, they
do start a disintegration of the zoning plan, and they do undermine confidence
in its integrity,
50. Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations, and Neighborhood Decline in
Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. Riv. 470 (1953).
51. See text at note 68 infra.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

ment Authority has pointed to incompatible land uses as one major
cause of such blighting influences as the splitting up of neighborhoods,
residential obsolescence, physical isolation and lack of sunlight.5 2 A
recent study of Baltimore Board of Zoning Appeals action along the
"strip zoned" Belair Road area reveals not only an inordinately high
rate of variance and special exception grants, but also a seepage of
commercial interests into surrounding residentially zoned sections.55
Such seepage cultivates the seeds of urban deterioration in those areas.
Illegal variances are a prime cause of decay in residential neighborhoods.5 4 The presence of unjustified commercial and industrial
variations in a residential district creates eyesores, makes a high level
of maintenance impossible, and invariably lessens the residential desirability of an area. "A lowered residential desirability, in turn, further
weakens the resistance of a neighborhood to the inroads of business,
rooming houses, crowded tenements, and other undesirable uses." '5
Good examples of this creeping erosion of residential areas may be
found in the increasing number of industrial variations that blot the
Roxbury section of Boston and in the spreading commercial encroachment in the Belair and Reisterstown Road areas of Baltimore. As
departures from the neighborhood pattern accumulate, the basic aims
of zoning are increasingly ignored. Zoning's protective purposes conservation of property values, provision of adequate light and air,
maintenance of public health and safety and the preservation and promotion of the city's amenities - may be lost in the tide of improper
variances created by the boards of appeal.
Abuse of the variance procedure also weakens the use of zoning
as a positive measure in city replanning.5 6 The basic premise of comprehensive planning is that it is based on long-range projections; proper
projection of land uses should not be distorted by immediate pressures
and short-sighted considerations.5 7 Granting a variance for reasons
other than extreme hardship may seem innocuous in its present impact
on the immediate neighborhood. However, "long-range planning may
show that this will result in a flood of such demands, or be inconsistent
with the desirable allocation of land uses for commercial purposes in
the entire municipality, or hinder the proposed future evolution of the
area into a fine residential one."5 " Thus, improper variances not only
threaten neighborhood integrity and undercut the protective purposes
of zoning, but they also challenge the objectives of comprehensive
urban planning.
52. Boston Redevelopment Authority, General Plan for the City of Boston,
11-3 (1964).
53. Geiselman, Belair Road: A Zoning Jungle, Evening Sun (Baltimore), Jan.
3, 1968, § B at 1, col. 1.
54. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280 (1955).
55. Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations, and Neighborhood Decline in
Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 470, 471 (1953).
56. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280 (1955).
57. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTtMP.
PROD. 353, 372 (1955).
58. Id.
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Proof of actual improprieties is hard to obtain, but a sampling
of statistics gathered in various cities supports the allegation that an
alarming number of illegal variances are granted. In Cincinnati, one of
the earliest exponents of master planning, 1,493 of 1,940 variance
requests were granted in a ten year period from 1926 to 1937. Philadelphia's Board of Adjustment granted 4,000 of 4,800 variance applications from 1933 to 1937." 9 Statistics compiled for 1946 summarize
the situation in Austin, where 240 of 358 appeals were granted, in
Milwaukee, where 121 of 163 were allowed, and in Rochester, where
230 variances were permitted out of 325 cases heard." More current
reports show that variations were granted in 952 of 1,134 cases in
Los Angeles during 1955 alone6 1 and that a total of 2,640 variations
were allowed in Chicago from 1942 to 1953.62 During 1952, the
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Board of Appeals granted 99 variances
and denied 17; 48 of the variances granted were for use and the other
51 were dimensional variations.6 "While mere numbers are not proof
of improper action they are certainly grounds for suspicion. '""

Some

boards of appeal act illegally in well
reputable authorities assert that
65
over half the cases they hear.

Because of the confusion between variances and special exceptions
in Baltimore, and because the Board records prevent accurate isolation
of variance actions, the statistics for Baltimore must be based on a
combined summary of all Board actions, a number of which are apparently variances.6 6 In 1966, the Board approved or conditionally approved 399 of 535 applications made to it, and in 1967, 379 of 464
requests received either approval or conditional approval from the
Board.6 ' The Boston situation may also bear out statistical inferences
of impropriety. In Boston, from July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, 367
before
variance applications were filed; 18 of these were withdrawn
68
hearing, and of the remainder heard, 283 were granted.

Out of

59. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
See Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. Rev. 516 (1955), which shows fewer grants
for Philadelphia in 1955 in terms of absolute numbers, but also indicates that the
ratio of grants to denials was still significantly high.
60. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 282 (1955).
61. Los Angeles City Planning Comm'n, Accomplishments, 1955.
62. Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations and Neighborhood Decline in
Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 470 (1953).
63. C. HAAR, LAND-USg PLANNING 296 (1959).
64. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONThIMP. PROB. 280, 281 (1955).
65. See LEARY, MODEL PROCEDURE FOR TE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS 10 (1959).
66. See Geiselman, Belair Road: A Zoning Jungle, Evening Sun (Baltimore),
Jan. 3, 1968, § B at 1, col. 1. See also note 12 supra.
67. Statistical Report on Zoning Appeals Scheduled for Hearing Year of 1966
(and Report of 1967) Showing Action Taken By the Board - Compiled by the Office
of the Board of the Municipal and Zoning Appeals, Baltimore.
68. Statistics compiled by Thomas E. McCormick, Director of Zoning in the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, for inclusion in Boston's workable program. The
figure is unpublished and was given by Mr. McCormick to the writer.
CONTUMP. PROR. 280 (1955).
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approximately 95 cases heard by the Board from November 1, 1966,
to February 8, 1967, 71 variances were authorized.69
Several recent cases illustrate that the Boston Board tends to
disregard potential harmful consequences of its decisions. In December, 1966, the Board gave a variance allowing a wholesale departure
from use restrictions in an apartment district in spots over a two block
area. ' ° The decision authorized the establishment of retail stores (subject to several conditions), offices and a bank branch, along with
departures from side-yard, rear-yard and set-back limitations. Perhaps
the fact that the applicant was a children's hospital influenced the Board;
legal variance standards certainly could not have. Zoning planners in
the Redevelopment Authority could find no hardship with respect to
the properties in question and could foresee deleterious consequences
for the surrounding neighborhood should the variance pass. The planners, to no avail, recommended denial of the request. One Boston
planner expressed the attitude of most zoning experts toward such
arbitrary board action: "This kind of action, wholly out of kilter with
the statute and neighborhood considerations, makes our job futile.
We plan and recommend with zoning objectives in mind, and the Board
continually ignores us. .

.

. I estimate that the Board disregards our

recommendations about 60% of the time."'" The land use expertise
of the city planning staff makes it uniquely qualified to maintain the
integrity of both neighborhood zoning and the overall city plan.
"It should therefore be respected when it speaks to the question of
whether the granting of a variance would result in a substantial change
in the character of the neighborhood ....

,,71

The advice of planners seems to have little effect on the Baltimore
Board. In a recent appeal taken under Section 40(c) of the Baltimore
69. These statistics were compiled by the writer. They are only "approximate"
because all Board decisions for this period were not yet on file at the time they were
compiled. A breakdown of the Boston decisions since 1965 discloses that most variances fall into four broad categories: (1) dimensional variations, including departures
from yard, area and height requirements, account for over 50% of the grants; (2) use
variances, frequently approving commercial or industrial activity in a residential or
apartment zone, comprise over 20%; (3) parking modifications, relaxing off-street
parking regulations outlined by the new code, occur about 10% of the time; and,
(4) permission for multiple dwellings, often necessitating a combination of dimensional
and use variations, account for 8%. An analysis of Baltimore statistics also discloses
high percentages for use and dimensional variations, though in Baltimore the percentage
of use variations exceeds the dimensional figures, and an almost identical percentage
exists for family or multiple dwelling grants. See Statistical Report, supra note 67.
The high percentage of dimensional variances has been attributed to the view,
common to boards of appeal, that an adjustment in set-back or yard restrictions will
have only a slight effect on neighboring property owners. A three foot rear building
addition would not seem to block an appreciable amount of light and air, see Note,
Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. Riv.
516 (1955), but a "slight effect" rationalization cannot explain the large number of
use variances which ordinarily permit burgeoning commercialization of residence districts or the growth of malignant industrial activity in apartment zones.
70. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 340-350 Longwood Ave. and 410 Brookline Ave., Ward 4, Dec. 7, 1966. These decisions are taken from Boston Building
Department files and from notes taken while observing Board hearings.
71. This statement was made to the writer "off the record" by an official of the
Zoning Department of the Boston Redevelopment Authority on Feb. 24, 1967.
72. Note, Syracuse Board of Zoning Appeals - An Appraisal, 16 SYR. L. REv.
632, 639 (1965).
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zoning ordinance, the hardship provision, the Board granted the request of an applicant to house six families and two roomers on premises
situated in a residence use district."3 The area requirements for this
property permitted only four families to occupy the premises. The file
in this case contains a letter, dated July 19, 1968, from Robert C.
Embry, Jr., Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Community Development of Baltimore City, to Gilbert Rubin, Executive
Director of the Baltimore Board. This letter, filed as a protest to the
grant of the variance in question, states, inter alia:
The Department of Housing and Community Development opposes
this application, since the requested use exceeds the Density Provisions of Section 29(p) of the Zoning Ordinance of Baltimore
City and there is no apparent reason for an exception thereunder.
The Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals is urged to dis74
approve this appeal.
Nevertheless, in approving the applicant's request as to the number
of families that may occupy the premises, the Board's written decision
completely ignored the recommendation of the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development 75 and made no mention of the
existence of any hardship - the basic legal requirement for allowing
a variation under Section 40(c).76
A pattern generally prevalent in variance decisions is the distinct
absence of specific findings based on legal standards. Instead, boards
generally support their variance grants with boilerplate language such
as that on which the Boston Board rested its verdict in one variance
case: "The Board finds . . . that exceptional circumstances peculiar
to this specific case justify a relaxation of the restrictions imposed by
the statute, and that the varying of the terms of the Zoning Act . . .
will not conflict with the intent and spirit of the Zoning Act. . . .77
This finding, because of its lack of substance, would not withstand
73. Appeal No. 264-268, 18 E. Madison Street, July 25, 1968.
74. Letter from Robert C. Embry, Jr. to Gilbert Rubin, July 19, 1968, record,
Appeal No. 264-268, 18 E. Madison Street, July 25, 1968.
75. For another example of the Board's ignoring planner's recommendations and
legal requirements, see Appeal No. 159-68, and appeals related thereto on the 1800
Block of Eutaw Place, decided May 31, 1968.
The Boston Board recently authorized a use variance to allow the expansion
of a woodworking factory in a single residence zone; Johnson Woodworking Co., 33
Moreland St., Nov. 30, 1966; and a short time later permitted a metal company to
expand its operation in a general residence district by granting use, yard and parking
variations. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 15 Empire St., Ward 22, Jan. 20, 1967. Neither
decision makes mention of neighborhood considerations. Both appear to have been
influenced by the existence of non-conforming uses in the area proximate to the
properties in question. Boards in other cities have also been swayed by nearby nonconformity. See Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. Rnv. 516 (1955) ; Note, Syracuse Board of Zoning Appeals - An
Appraisal, 16 SYR. L. Riv. 632, 639 (1965). The courts, however, have rejected such
justifications as an unlawful basis for continuously cutting into a residential neighborhood with a commercial carving knife. See notes 37-41 supra.
76. BALTIMORE, MD., CODn art. 30, § 40(c) (1966).
77. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 15 Empire St., Ward 22, Jan. 20, 1967. For
examples of Baltimore decisions similarly ignoring legal limitations and land use
considerations, see Appeal No. 45-68, 31, 37-39 Eastern Avenue; Appeal No. 75-68,
5901-13 Eastern Avenue.
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judicial challenge. Variance relief will only be upheld by a reviewing
court where there is "a definite statement of rational causes and
motives founded upon adequate findings" and "not mere repetition of
statutory words."" Yet the boards seem no more inclined to ponder
judicial standards of legality than to recognize that they might be
planting the seeds of urban blight in a particular area.
A salient factor in board decisions which permit variances is apparently the absence of opposition to the variance. In fact, a high-ranking
Baltimore Board official has stated that the presence of protestants is
the one factor which most frequently causes the Board to adhere to
legal requirements for variations. 79 A recent study in Philadelphia
reports that the absence of protestants also has a "significant effect"
on board action in that city.8 0 In Ithaca, New York, three years of
regular observation revealed that "where no opposition is voiced the
Board bats very close to 1.000 in approvals."'" The correlation between the absence of protestants and successful requests, however,
may be only ostensibly meaningful.8 2 Protestants have attended too
few cases to venture significant conclusions about their influence on
the boards' decisional processes.8 3 At least in the case of Boston, most
Board hearings are attended only by the variance applicants. At any
rate, "it is frightening to think that the criterion used by the Board
of Appeals for approval or disapproval of variance applications is the
presence or absence of protests. If such is the case, then the rule is
of men and not the law."8 4 If this is true, the legal standards of the
78. Prusik v. Board of Appeal, 262 Mass. 451, 160 N.E. 312 (1928). See also
Kennerly v. Mayor and City Council, 247 Md. 601, 607, 233 A.2d 800, 804 (1967).
79. Statement made by the Executive Director of the Baltimore Board in an
interview with the writer.
80. Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 516, 541-45 (1955). This Note uncovers patterns based more on
types of variances and neighborhood circumstances than does this article. The discrepancy in views between the Note and the instant offering may be explained by the
different techniques used in the two projects. The law review staff assigned to the
Philadelphia project worked very closely with the Philadelphia Board of Adjustment;
the writer of this article did more observing of, rather than working with, the Boston
and Baltimore Boards. While this article does not purport to make as probing a
statistical analysis as did the Philadelphia project, it is hoped that the techniques used
will avoid the Hawthorne effect which apparently crept into the law review's efforts.
One member of the review (at the time of the survey) felt that the Board of Adjustment was "on its best behavior throughout" the period of observation.
81.

LEARY, MODEL PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS

10 (1959).
82. On the basis of Boston decisions since 1965 reviewed by the writer, it is estimated that protestants attend only about 3% of the Board's hearings. This low figure
may be due to the lack of immediacy most residents in low income neighborhoods feel
concerning variances. Also, attendance at Board hearings may be difficult due to the
day on which they are held - Wednesday of each week; it seems unlikely that an
employer would be willing to allow an employee time off to attend a variance
hearing. The Boston notice requirements that copies of variance applications be
delivered to neighboring property owners and published in newspapers follow the
pattern existing in other jurisdictions. They seem adequate to apprise most potential
protestants of the hearing.
83. See note 82 supra.
84. LARY, MODEL PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS 10, 11 (1959).

1969]

THE ZONING VARIANCE POWER

variance procedure, as imposed by statute and expounded by the
judiciary, become even more illusory."5
Accounts of board improprieties have been recorded in a number
of cities."6 There are numerous Boston and Baltimore cases where
the boards have relaxed lot and family restrictions, despite non-compliance with statutory standards, to allow conversion of single family
homes to multi-family residences . 7 Some of these cases may be the
product of questionable ex parte influence. Whatever the source of their
illegality, unjustified multiple-dwelling variances pierce the protective
veil of the zoning code. They cause the population of a neighborhood
to increase without any relation to the locational requirements of the
ordinance. Again the variance procedure in practice exceeds its theoretical and legal limitations, and the danger of urban blight increases.
The actual operation of the variance machinery of Boston and
Baltimore, when compared with court opinions on variance power,
suggests that variance decisions possess a high degree of legal vulnerability: "A very high percentage of them would not survive review by
even the most tolerant court."8 8 Why, then, has there not been a judicial
85. While a first hand observation of a board of appeals hearing may not be
statistically significant, it does convey a sense of the atmosphere in which this disregard for legal standards and planning recommendations occurs. In February, 1967,
an applicant came before the Boston Board requesting that she be able to make use
of her home as a three family apartment. The property was located in an S-5 district
which allowed semi-detached residences, with one family on each side of a party wall,
as the most intensive use in the zone. The desired variance not only necessitated use
deviations, but also involved departures from lot requirements. When asked to state
her reasons for the appeal, the applicant recounted the following story: "My family
has changed so that only my husband and me are left in the house. We would like to
live there, but we would also like to rent as much of it as possible so that we can
get some needed money out of it - to help us with our living expenses and taxes . ..."
In response, one Board member stated: "I don't see any hardship here.
Certainly someone can use the property under existing zoning regulations." The
applicant answered: "I needed the whole house for a number of years while I was
taking care of my deceased sister's children. Now that they're gone, I would like to
live in it and use the extra space for income." The Board appeared more sympathetically disposed toward the applicant at this point, but the member who spoke
previously then stated: "A variance cannot be granted solely for an applicant's personal benefit." Somewhat confused, the applicant closed her case by saying that she
did not think it should make a difference that others could use the property, and that
she should "be able to use it to make enough money so that I can continue to live in it."
The case, theoretically, seemed destined for a negative disposition, but the
forces that so often prostitute the variance machinery began to show themselves. At
the conclusion of the hearing a Building Department staff member happened by the
Board room. He proceeded to inform the Board that the "lady at the Larchmont
Street property certainly has need for a variance. I've seen her house, and know
her case well. She's a friend of my sister, and can't hurt anyone by making some
apartments." Replying to a Board question of whether he thought hardship existed,
the staff member answered affirmatively without explanation. The Board then implied
to him that favorable action would be taken on the request. 26 Larchmont St.,
Dorchester, Feb. 24, 1967. The dialogue in this case comes from notes taken by the
writer at the Board of Appeals hearing in this case.
86. E.g., SMITH, CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ZONING 97 (1965).
87. E.g., Sullivan, 87 Wallingford Rd., Ward 21, Jan. 11, 1967 (Boston) ; Bowen,
668 Lagrange, Jan. 25, 1967 (Boston) ; Lonno, 17 Snow St., Ward 21, Jan. 20, 1967
(Boston); Fahey, 20 Birchland St., Ward 20, Jan. 4, 1967 (Boston); Appeal No.
165-68, 162--68, 187-68, 209-68 (Balto.). For a review of a similar experience in
Philadelphia, see Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 547 (1955).
88. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 294 (1955).
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curtailment of the alleged flood of unjustified variance grants? The
answer to this question probably lies in the fact that only a handful
of the three hundred or more annual board of appeals decisions in each
of these cities actually reach the courts.8 9 Perhaps some decisions go
unchallenged because they stand on sound legal ground. However, if
inferences of board improprieties are correct, the paucity of judicial
review must be explained differently. Unjustified variations apparently
are not subjected to judicial review because the individuals most seriously affected by them, low income residents of declining neighborhoods, lack the resources and legal understanding to level a judicial
attack." The expense of a court appeal, involving attorney's fees and
the expert witnesses which are almost always necessary in zoning
cases, can be exorbitant. Even where legal resources have been available, "it is only in flagrant cases of abuse of authority - and then
only if the financial stakes are sufficiently large - that decisions are
taken to any court."'" Occasionally, a frustrated planning board will
seek to protect the public interest by bringing actions to reverse unjustified variations.9 2 Public officials, however, largely tend to ignore
legal lapses by the boards of appeal:
For some inexplicable reason the fact is that the zoning ordinance,
which was probably very costly in time, effort, and dollars, is being
shot full of holes and those who are charged with preservation of
the public interest and also protection of the public funds cannot
seem to work up any excitement about this grievous waste. 9
Thus, property owners in areas affected by illegal variances must often
accept their plight without effective recourse. As a result, the role of
zoning as a protective measure sinks lower in their estimation.
The lack of effective judicial review may in part explain the gap
between the theory and practice of the variance, but there are other
asserted causes of variance abuse which warrant mention. Unjustified
variations may be fostered in many cities by the lack of meaningful
criteria which has traditionally characterized the variance sections of
zoning ordinances. 94 Statutory vagueness has made the variance pro89. From 1949 to 1963, only twenty-nine appeals from variance decisions in
Massachusetts, aside from those involving purely procedural or jurisdictional questions, were taken to the Supreme Judicial Court. The right to take an appeal (first
to the Superior Court) is given to an "aggrieved person" in Massachusetts and in
numerous other jurisdictions. The "aggrieved person" concept is broad enough to
cover most property owners in the area if they are able to show some reasonable
probability of injury, economic or physical. For a discussion of this requirement, see
Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. Rtv. 1396, 1400 (1960). In Baltimore only 15
of 464 cases heard by the Board were appealed to the Baltimore City Court.
90. Community legal services, such as Harvard University's Community Legal
Assistance Office, may be able to give these poorer individuals a weapon against
illegal variances. See Birgbauer, Legal Service for the Poor (unpublished paper in
the Harvard Law School Library).
91. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 294 (1955).

92. E.g., Planning Board v. Board of Appeals, 338 Mass. 160, 154 N.E.2d 349
(1958).
93. LEARY, MODEL PROCEDURE FOR TIiE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS 11 (1959).
94. See Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1396, 1406 (1960).
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cedure particularly susceptible to the dispensation of special favors9 5
or to the decision of variance applications on the basis of the board's
sympathies rather than genuine land use considerations.96 In fact, one
leading planner has recommended more specificity in zoning statutes
as the panacea for eliminating board of appeals abuses.9 7 Yet recent
experiences reveal that even where statutory standards have been made
more definite, as in Boston and Syracuse, 98 the tide of abuse does not
appear to have been stemmed. At most, boards will make formal
findings on each statutory requirement. This has not, however, deterred them from "discovering hardship in commercial inconvenience,
uniqueness in disadvantages shared by a neighborhood, and an absence
of adverse effect in the expansion of a non-conforming use." 9 Uncertain standards may make variance misuse more frequent, but inadequate statutory definition certainly cannot be viewed as the major cause
of illegal variations. Cities undertaking the enactment of new zoning
codes should not expect that more specific statutory standards, by
themselves, will result in an ebb in the flow of questionable variations
from the boards of appeal.
Zoning in general, and the variance procedure in particular, have
frequently been regarded as invitations to improper influence. 100 Some
have characterized illegal variances as a product of the venality of
politics. For example, in Chicago it has been asserted that:
Political influence often determines whether Council approval is
obtained, and narrow ward interests are substituted for interests
of the entire city. As is often true, one variation becomes the
basis for a well-grounded request for subsequent variation, and a
snow ball movement begins, opening the way for complete destruction of the effectiveness of the zoning ordinance.'
The most significant cause of the breakdown in zoning's variance
safety valve lies in the nature of its mainspring, the board of appeals.
95. Id.
96. SMITH, CITIZEN'S GuIDIg To ZONING (1965).
97. Pomeroy, Modern Trends in Zoning, NEw YORK STATE PLANNING NEws 4
(Sept.-Oct. 1960).
98. See SYRACUSE, N.Y., ZONING RULES AND REGULATIONS art. 5.4.8 (1961).
99. Anderson, Board of Zoning Appeals - Villain or Victim?, 13 SYR. L. Riv.
353, 386 (1961).
100. For examples and discussion of these improper influences as they bear on
zoning, see Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMPLE L.Q. 267, 282-83
(1968). In Boston, a zoning official has alleged "off the record" that the "big boys"
have no trouble in getting their variance applications approved. "When fellows like...
[a large Boston based construction firm] seek variances, planning recommendations
and statutory requirements are almost totally ignored." Thomas E. McCormick,
Director of Zoning, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Feb. 24, 1967. The innuendo
of corrupt politics underlying these statements, in the absence of a full scale and
probing investigation, defies proof. Moreover, at least in the case of Baltimore and
Boston, corruption cannot be condemned as a sole cause of the deleterious effects of
variance abuse. It is probable that only a few of the large number of allegedly
improper variances are actually attributable to political machinations. A review of
Baltimore and Boston board decisions discloses few applicants who would be in a
position to command political influence or who have the financial means for "marketable" variations.
101. Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations and Neighborhood Decline in
Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 470 (1953). In Chicago, the city legislative body has
ultimate authority over variances.
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The board itself must bear the responsibility for the tide of illegal
variations which robs the zoning concept of its effectiveness as a protective and planning mechanism. With regard to the Baltimore Board,
it has been said:
Because of its powers to grant exceptions and variances, the
Zoning Board over the years has been the chief instrument for
breaking down zoning protection, allowing commercial operations
to encroach upon residential properties. By granting a commercial
extension in one place and a new sign in another the board has
satisfied the steady stream of petitioners and in the process helped
to create the sorry hodgepodges to be found along such thoroughfares as Belair Road....102
The crucial shortcoming of the board of appeals is its lack of
expertise. Most board members are not trained in municipal planning,
zoning law or any other discipline relevant to their duties. 11 3 This may
explain why they frequently reject the advice of planners in favor of
their own parochial notions. 4 Political considerations often govern
the selection of the board;105 most boards are appointed by the mayor
and are "citizen agencies" composed of representatives of various
political and business interests in the community. °6 Their business
and political orientation makes board members much more likely to
be impressed by the "practical" business effects of relief rather than
by technical legal limitations, social consequences or planning implications: "Certainly there is a prejudgment if zoning board members are
allied to the very interests which they are expected to control."'0 ° At
best, the qualifications of board members may be said to stem from
a close association with the community, familiarity with the areas involved and a supposed harmony with public opinion.'
This local
background, however, may be a mixed blessing, since it may make
board members vulnerable to the pressure of friends, business associates
or politicians. 9
Board members are susceptible not only to the practical arguments
of business interests or close associates; they have also displayed a
general tendency to help individuals circumvent the law. Because they
are selected from the community at large, they have "a natural disposition not to be too harsh on [their] neighbors. '"" '
For example,
an applicant appeared before the Boston Board seeking permission for
102. The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 4, 1968, at A14, col. 1.
103. C. HAAR, LAW & LAND 135 (1964).
104. Note, Judicial Control Over Zoning Boards of Appeals: Suggestions for
Reform, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 937 (1965).
105. C. HAAR, LAW & LAND 135 (1964).
106. Anderson, Board of Zoning Appeals - Villain or Victim?, 13 SYR. L. REv.
353, 387 (1961).
107. Note, Judicial Control Over Zoning Boards of Appeals: Suggestions for
Reform, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 937, 946 (1965).
108. Id.
109. Id. See also note 85 supra.
110. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1396, 1407 (1960).
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substantial lot and yard variations. 1 1' The applicant explained that he
had "inadvertently" subdivided in violation of the zoning regulations
for his residential district. Board members studied his plans and tried
to suggest various ways in which he could reduce his violation. The
applicant refused to make any changes. He demonstrated neither the
unique circumstances nor the hardship to his property necessary, in
theory, to obtain a variance. The acting Board chairman rhetorically
asked him if he had "given us some reasons showing hardship." The
applicant again stated that he had made an "unfortunate error" in
subdividing - certainly not a proper showing of adversity. Despite
the absence of any legal findings, the Board expressed its commiseration with the2 applicant's plight and indicated that the variance would
be allowed."
Board members are often willing to grant applications where the
variance sought apparently could cause little immediate harm. In a
recent case before the Baltimore Board, the applicant sought to build
113
fifty-eight apartment units on land located in a residence use district.
Although no legal justification appeared to exist for the applicant's
request, the Board granted him an exception. In its decision, the Board
emphasized that the applicant had obtained the consent of the neighbors
of the property in question. It is submitted, however, that the mere
non-existence of protest from neighbors should not blind the board to
overall long-range community interest in maintaining population densities within the legal limitations prescribed by the zoning ordinance.
It has become increasingly clear that the board of appeals, in its
present form, is not well suited for its task. Its members generally
lack an understanding of the technicalities and policies of the zoning
ordinance and show little concern for the overall integrity of the zoning
scheme. As long as this situation continues, the flow of illegal variations will persist and the consequent problem of neighborhood decline
will remain unsolved. Repairs are needed for the mechanism of zoning's
safety valve; the board of appeals must be reformed so that the variance
procedure will operate in the way it was designed. Other aspects of the
variance machinery should undergo reform to insure that variations, in
practice, stay within their theoretical bounds.
III.

VARIANCE REFORM REPAIRING

PROPOSALS FOR

THE LEAKAGE

Whatever one's view of the extent of flexibility needed in zoning
administration, it is patent that the administration of the vari111.

735 & 739 Truman Highway, Feb. 24, 1967; based on notes taken at the hear-

ing by the writer.

112. Similar experiences have been recounted by New Jersey's former chief planner,
who has summarized this tendency of boards as a desire to:
"help this poor fellow in his time of trouble" - his "trouble" being, in nine cases
out of ten, that he wants to do something that the established law will not
permit. . . . Applicants, in many cases, are individuals who have paid taxes for
the past forty years, . . . are "good" people, and the members of the Board just
don't want to offend them.
SMITH, CITIZEN's GuIDE TO ZONING 96-99 (1965).
113. Appeal No. 127-68, 6503 Park Heights Ave.
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ance .
. procedures is inadequate under existing institutions.
Discriminations may be rampant in individual cities and towns
and standards may vary markedly from municipality to municipality within the same metropolitan area. Certainly the situation
has reached the point where extensive reform is in order." 4
The need for variance reform is emphasized by the absence of any other
land use device to fulfill the legitimate zoning functions for which variances were designed. Amendments to the comprehensive zoning ordinance and zoning map were not intended to relieve hardship applicable
only to individual pieces of property. Instead, the amendment process
was conceived to correct mistakes in the original zoning scheme, or
to accommodate general changes in conditions which occur after the
enactment of the ordinance. The amendment process, essentially legislative in character, is more complicated and time consuming than the
variance procedure: "As a practical matter, since it involves municipal
legislative action, it may be available only where municipal officials
perceive initially the need for the change or become convinced of its
desirability on the urging of interested individuals.""' 5
The only possible alternative to the variance is the special exception, which is sometimes referred to as a conditional use. The exception
is better suited to provide individual relief than an amendment. When
compared to variances, exceptions have the advantage of greater certainty, because the purposes for which they may be granted are explicitly enumerated in the zoning ordinance." 6 However, because
exceptions are part of a statutory scheme, their exclusive use may
preclude relief in justifiable situations not foreseen by the local legislative body, the very situations which variances were designed to
remedy. There are, thus, no existing alternatives which satisfactorily
accomplish the safety valve objectives of variations; a properly functioning variance procedure is necessary to provide readily available
interstitial relief where individual hardship arises.
Any effort toward reform must first be directed at the present
source of variances, the board of appeals. It has become distressingly
clear that: "The concept of the board of appeals as a kind of poor man's
court where common sense justice is dispensed by one's friends and
neighbors no longer has much validity."" ' 7 The increasing complexity
of zoning ordinances, especially in large urban areas like Baltimore and
Boston, and the growing demands for more positive zoning to aid in
community planning, housing conservation and urban renewal, dictate
that those qualified through professional training or experience have a
greater say in the variance procedure. This view may have inspired
the drafters of the new Boston code to require planning reports in
certain variance cases. Under the new code, the Boston Board of
Appeals must receive recommendations from the Redevelopment
114.
115.
116.
117.

C.

HAAR, LAW & LAND 141 (1964).
Id. at 143.
Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. Rzv. 1396, 1407 (1960).
Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONT MP. PROB. 280, 296 (1955).
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Authority on four "critical" kinds of variance applications."' The
drafters of the code felt that the advice of experts would be particularly
necessary where requests were made for height variations, for commercial or industrial uses in residential districts, or for expansion of
non-conforming uses which presently exceed certain floor space or lot
measurements." 9 The new ordinance also makes it clear that planning
2°
reports may be desirable in other types of variance applications.
However, in view of the board of appeals' tendency not to follow the
recommendations of planners, this Boston scheme for expanding the
advisory role of zoning planners in the variance process will probably
accomplish little.
The most direct approach to the prevention of variance abuses
would be to eliminate the board of appeals and to confer its functions
on the local planning board.' 2 ' There is, however, a less drastic reform
that may appease those who believe that the voice of the layman must
continue to be heard in the variance process. Under such an approach
a municipal zoning administrator or zoning ombudsman could be delegated the power to appeal to the courts any decision of the board which
he believes to be illegal. In this way, the preservation of the zoning
ordinance and the protection it affords various neighborhoods would
be made a public duty, and would not depend on the vicissitudes of
private initiative. This practice, already implemented in Denver, Colorado, appears to have made one board of appeals recognize the legal
limits of its authority. 2 2 Analogous reforms might empower local
planning commissions or state zoning authorities to appeal or to veto
board decisions. 2' Again, the role of the board would not be eliminated, but its excesses would be checked by an authority with a broader
perspective of land use needs and the overall public interest.
Another recurrent target of variance reformers is the so-called
use variance. 21 Use variations are often necessary to the operation of
profitable commercial or industrial activities in residential districts.
Where the financial stake of an applicant is sufficiently large, political
and monetary inducements, rather than legal standards, have been said
118.

BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE

§ 7-2 (1955).

119. WEISMANTEL, PROCEDURE OF THE NEW
ment Authority Planning Dep't, 1965).

ZONING CODE

20 (Boston Redevelop-

120. Id.
121.

SHURTLEF & CANTELMO, PLANNING LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN MASSA-

CHUSETTs 64 (1964).
122. LEARY, MODEL

PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION

OF ZONING REGULA-

The theory underlying the Denver approach is that the Board of
Zoning Appeals is a quasi-judicial body and as such is a distinct level in the judicial
system. The decisions of the Board are treated in the same manner as decisions of a
regular court. Thus, the Board does not become a party to an appeal taken from one
of its decisions. The applicant is liable for defense of an appeal taken against his
variance. This should have the effect of further discouraging unnecessary applications.
123. See Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26
U. CHI. L. Rzv. 509 (1959).
124. See F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY, THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE WITH
COMMENTARY § 9-3, at 52 (3d ed. 1966) ; LEARY, MODEL PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS 10, 76 (1959): "The granting of the use variance
is a pernicious practice and one which must be eliminated if zoning and its benefits
are to endure." See also Reps, DiscretionaryPowers of the Board of Zoning Appeals,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 296 (1955).
TIONS 85 (1959).
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to guide some boards to favorable use variance decisions.12 5 A use
variation is rarely, if ever, the "minimum" variance necessary to
relieve hardship ;126 a dimensional deviation should almost always afford
adequate relief. A review of Baltimore and Boston use variance cases
over the last two years discloses no situation in which there was no
person who could utilize the property under existing use limitations.
Similarly, an "[e]xamination of the use variances granted by the
Syracuse board reveals few applicants whose situation was so acute
as to support a claim that the regulations were unconstitutional as
applied to them." '27 Under legal standards of hardship, unique circumstances, and preservation of neighborhood integrity, use variations
can only be justified in extremely rare situations. In the light of the
obvious danger of abuse, therefore, it seems wise to prohibit them
altogether. 128 Indeed, in some states the use variation has already received a judicial burial.129 In Josephson v. Autrey,' a Florida case,
the court stated that a board cannot employ its variance authority to
accomplish what would be, in effect, a rezoning. The court felt that
the allowance of a prohibited use through the granting of a variance
would have the effect of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, which
a board of appeals is powerless to enact. The immediate effect of this
decision is to assure that the policy-making function of zoning is kept
in the legislative realm, where it belongs. While no statistics are available concerning this approach to reform, its effective operation in some
areas of the country at least permits the conclusion
that it may be rea131
sonably successful in reducing variance abuse.
A tenable, although as yet untried avenue of reform would be to
require that zoning maps show the location of variances. Maps indicating the locus of all variances should serve as a constant reminder to
the boards of the cumulative effect of their actions and might, therefore, deter them from granting variations with unwarranted liberality.13 2
Where variance symbols on the map are highly concentrated, the board
should recognize conditions of general hardship which do not warrant
variance relief, but point to the need for rezoning. The zoning ordinance and map could be amended periodically in order to assure that
the inability to make a reasonable use of the land did not arise from
125. Von Eckardt, Zoning Corrupts Gov't, Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 1966, at 31, col. 4
(A.M. ed.).
126. See text at note 20 supra.
127. Anderson, Board of Zoning Appeals - Villain or Victim?, 13 SYR. L. REv.
353, 387 (1961).
128. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280, 296 (1955). E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:55-39(c) (1948, as
amended 1953).
129. See F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY, THt TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE WITH
COMMENTARY (3d ed. 1966).
130. 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957).
131.
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132. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
280, 295 (1955): "The cumulative damage done to the municipal
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poor zoning. 1 33 This periodic revision could be a most effective means
for reducing the need for individual relief.
Although they do not warrant detailed discussion, other corrective measures should be considered when making repairs of the variance
machinery. These measures involve the institution of certain procedural
requirements, almost non-existent in today's variance process. First,
variance application forms should be cast in the form of pleadings.
Applicants would then be forced to state their reasons for requesting
a variance in terms of the legal standards outlined in the ordinance.
This requirement should reduce confusion, eliminate irrelevant lines of
inquiry, and compel both the applicant and the board to consider only
the essential issues. 134 Second, testimony heard in connection with
variance applications should be under oath and should be confined to
statements relevant to the legal issues under consideration. The requiring of sworn testimony should apprise both applicant and board
of the seriousness of the matter at hand. Furthermore, the relevancy
requirement might preclude the introduction of statements which would
improperly arouse board sympathies. Third, the board, in its statement
of findings, should be required to specifically accept or reject every
consideration raised in the application and explicitly state the reasons
for such action.'1 5 Such a requirement would, again, make the board
more aware of its responsibility to consider a variance application
solely on the basis of its legal merit.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the suggested reforms are ignored, the protective shield provided
by zoning ordinances will continue to be pierced by indiscriminately
authorized variations. Repeated abuse by boards of appeal has transformed the variance from a device for zoning safety into a dangerous
threat to the integrity of land use control. Unless this abuse is halted,
the destructive consequences of illegal variances will spread increasing
blight throughout our urban neighborhoods. If, however, reforms are
instituted, variance practice can be brought closer to its theoretical
objectives and, once again, may be applied to constructive rather than
disruptive ends.
133. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. Rzv. 1396, 1408 (1960).
134. Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW &
CONT7MP. PROB. 280, 295 (1955).
135. Note, Board of Zoning Appeals Procedure, 16 SYR. L. Riv. 568, 581 (1965).

